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Abstract. Classical results in voting theory show that strategic ma-
nipulation by voters is inevitable if a voting rule simultaneously satisfy
certain desirable properties. Motivated by this, we study the relevant
question of how often a voting rule is manipulable. It is well known that
elections with a large number of voters are rarely manipulable under im-
partial culture (IC) assumption. However, the manipulability of voting
rules when the number of candidates is large has hardly been addressed
in the literature and our paper focuses on this problem. First, we pro-
pose two properties (1) asymptotic strategy-proofness and (2) asymp-
totic collusion-proofness, with respect to new voters, which makes the
two notions more relevant from the perspective of computational prob-
lem of manipulation. In addition to IC, we explore a new culture of
society where all score vectors of the candidates are equally likely. This
new notion has its motivation in computational social choice and we
call it impartial scores culture (ISC) assumption. We study asymptotic
strategy-proofness and asymptotic collusion-proofness for plurality, veto,
k-approval, and Borda voting rules under IC as well as ISC assumptions.
Specifically, we prove bounds for the fraction of manipulable profiles
when the number of candidates is large. Our results show that the size
of the coalition and the tie-breaking rule play a crucial role in determin-
ing whether or not a voting rule satisfies the above two properties.
Keywords: Social choice theory, manipulation, collusion proofness, asymptotic
behavior
1 Introduction
In many real life situations including multi-agent systems, agents often need
to agree upon a common decision although they may have different prefer-
ences over the possible alternatives. The central problem in this scenario is
preference aggregation, that is, aggregating different preferences and agreeing
on a joint plan. Voting is a special type of preference aggregation method that
has been applied in many current problems, for example, collaborative filtering
[Pennock et al., 2000], planning among multiple automated agents [Ephrati and Rosenschein, 1991],
etc. A wide variety of voting rules have been proposed in the literature. A voting
rule in conjunction with the population of voters and candidates is commonly
referred to as an election.
A fundamental problem of voting rules is the strategic manipulation by voters
- sometimes voters are better off by voting non-truthfully. Informally, a voter
is said to manipulate an election if she does not report her true preference.
The Gibbard Satterthwaite theorem [Gibbard, 1973,Satterthwaite, 1975] shows
that every unanimous1 and non-dictatorial2 voting rule is manipulable. Clearly,
manipulation is undesirable and therefore we seek voting rules that are rarely
manipulable. Pattanaik [Pattanaik, 1975] conjectured that “the possibility of
strategic voting by single individuals will be smaller the greater the number of
the individuals.”
Pattanaik’s above conjecture has been subsequently verified. Slinko [Slinko, 2002]
showed that for some common voting rules that, under impartial culture (IC)3
assumption, the probability of drawing a manipulable profile at random goes to
zero as the number of voters increases. He called such voting rules asymptotically
strategy-proof. However the above result does not directly connect the compu-
tational problem of manipulation since it defines manipulable profiles through
the existence of manipulation by current voters in the profile. We, in this paper,
propose a definition of asymptotic strategy-proofness with respect to new vot-
ers which makes it consistent with the computational problem of manipulation
which is discussed below.
Bartholdi and coauthors [Bartholdi et al., 1989, Bartholdi and Orlin, 1991]
asked the following question: what if finding a manipulating preference is com-
putationally so hard that the agents will not be able to find it? This led to the
formulation and study of the computational problem of coalitional manipulation
(CM). In the CM problem, we are given a voting rule, a candidate (say x), a
set of c manipulators, and a voting profile of n non-manipulators on m candi-
dates, and we are asked whether the manipulators can make the candidate x
win the election or not. The CM problem for many common voting rules has
been shown to be NP-Complete [Faliszewski et al., 2008,Xia et al., 2010]. This
computational intractability seems to provide a kind of barrier against manipu-
lation for many common voting rules. However, since intractability only provides
a worst case guarantee, how much protection computational hardness provides
in actual practice, is questionable. This has been partially answered by Procac-
cia and Rosenschein [Procaccia and Rosenschein, 2007] by showing average case
easiness of the manipulation problem assuming junta distributions over the vot-
ers’ preferences. To the best of our knowledge, the following reverse question still
remains unanswered - given the inputs where the CM problem is actually hard,
how much severe is the problem of manipulation on those inputs? This question
1 A voting rule is called unanimous if whenever any candidate is most preferred by
all voters, that candidate is the winner.
2 A voting rule is called non-dictatorial if there does not exist any voter whose most
preferred candidate is always the winner irrespective of others’ votes.
3 Impartial culture assumption says that the voters’ preferences are independent and
uniformly distributed among all possible linear orders of the candidates.
is justified as there is no point in trying to stop manipulation at profiles which
are game theoretically strategy-proof. We address this question in this paper.
It is known that the CM problem can be solved inO
(
(c+m!)
m!
.poly (m,n, c)
)
time1. for any anonymous and efficient2 voting rule. The computational com-
plexity arises from the fact that there are O
(
(c+m!)
m!
)
different ways to dis-
tribute the c votes of manipulators among m! possible preferences. Hence all the
hard instances of the CM problem are elections with a large number of candi-
dates. This motivates us to study the severity of manipulation in elections with a
large number of candidates. Asymptotic strategy-proofness has been classically
studied keeping the number of candidates fixed and varying only the number of
voters. Hence the classical asymptotic strategy-proofness fails to connect itself
with computational problem of manipulation since for constant number of candi-
dates, complexity barrier does not exist. Also Nitzan [Nitzan, 1985] empirically
showed that the problem of manipulation is severe only in societies with small
number of voters. Hence it is the elections with small number of voters which
we should possibly target for preventing manipulation. However small elections
with only a few candidates are always easily manipulable - manipulators can
just try all possible linear orders over the candidates. This leaves only one case
open - elections with fixed number of voters but large number of candidates.
Contributions
Besides active theoretical interest, there are many practical scenarios as well
where the number of candidates could be large, for example, meta search en-
gines, employee selection by a committee, etc. In this paper, we study the ma-
nipulability of voting rules when the number of voters is fixed and the number
of candidates increases to infinity. The specific contributions of this paper are as
follows.
– We define the notions of asymptotic strategy-proofness and asymptotic collusion-
proofness with respect to new voters (definition 1) which makes the notions
more relevant from the perspective of computational problem of manipula-
tion. We show that the existing results on the manipulability for plurality,
veto, and k-approval voting rules continue to hold under the proposed defi-
nition of asymptotic strategy-proofness.
– We explore a new culture of society where all score vectors of the candidates
are equally likely. This new notion has its motivation in computational social
choice. We call this assumption impartial scores culture (ISC) assumption.
– We provide bounds for the fraction of manipulable profiles for voting rules
when the number of candidates is large. These bounds immediately tell us
whether or not the given voting rule is asymptotically collusion-proof. We
prove asymptotic results for plurality, veto, and k-approval voting rules un-
der both IC and ISC assumptions. We prove Borda rule is not asymptotic
1 poly(m,n, c) denotes the set of all polynomial functions over m,n, and c
2 A voting rule is efficient if winner determination is poly(m,n) time computable.
strategy-proof on the number of candidates under the IC assumption but
the problem is still unresolved under the ISC assumption. Our results show
that the size of the coalition and the tie-breaking rule being used play a
crucial role in determining whether or not a voting rule is asymptotically
strategy-proof.
Our results on asymptotic collusion-proofness of voting rules are summarized
as in Table 1.
Cases Plurality fora Plurality againstb Veto k-Approval, k > 1 Borda
c = 1, IC
√ × × k = o(m) : × ×
c = 1 , ISC
√ × × k = o(m) : × ×
c > 1 , IC × × × k = o(m) : × ×
c > 1 , ISC × × × k = o(m) : × ?
Table 1. Asymptotic strategy-proofness results on candidates
a Plurality Rule with lexicographic tie breaking rule for the manipulators
b Plurality Rule with lexicographic tie breaking rule against the manipulators
This work has been published before as an extended abstract in the interna-
tional conference on Autonomous agents and multi-agent systems [Dey and Narahari, 2014].
2 Preliminaries and New Definitions
Let V = {v1, v2, . . . , vn} be the set of voters and C = {c1, c2, . . . , cm} the set
of candidates. Each voter vi has a preference ≺i over the candidates which is
a linear order over C. The set L(C) denotes the set of all linear orders over
C. A map rc : ⊎n∈N+L(C)
n −→ 2C \ ∅ is called a voting correspondence1. A
map t : 2C \ ∅ −→ C is called a tie breaking rule. Commonly used tie breaking
rules are lexicographic tie breaking rule where ties are broken in accordance
with a ≻t∈ L(C). We, in this paper, study two types of tie breaking rules -
lexicographic tie breaking rule where ties are broken in favor of the manipulators
and against the manipulators respectively. A voting rule is r = t ◦ rc2. For
example, α = (α1, α2, . . . , αm) ∈ Rm with α1 ≥ α2 ≥ · · · ≥ αm naturally
defines a voting rule - a candidate gets score αi from a vote if it is placed at
the ith position and winner is the candidate with maximum score. This voting
rule is called a positional scoring rule based voting rule with score vector α. For
α = (m− 1,m− 2, . . . , 1, 0), we get the Borda voting rule. With αi = 1 ∀i ≤ k
and 0 else, the voting rule we get is known as k-Approval. Plurality is 1-Approval
and veto is (m− 1)-Approval.
1 By ⊎, we denote disjoint union. N+ := {1, 2, 3, . . . }. 2C denotes the power set of C.
∅ denotes the empty set.
2 ◦ denotes composition of mappings.
A voting rule is called anonymous if the names of the voters are irrelevant.
Formally, a voting rule r is anonymous if
∀n ∈ N+, ∀(≻1, . . . ,≻n) ∈ L(C)
n
, ∀σ ∈ Sn1
r(≻1, . . . ,≻n) = r(≻σ(1), . . . ,≻σ(n))
A voting rule is called neutral if the names of the candidates are immaterial.
That is,
∀n ∈ N+, ∀(≻1, . . . ,≻n) ∈ L(C)
n
, ∀σ ∈ Sm
r(σ◦ ≻1, . . . , σ◦ ≻n) = σ ◦ r(≻1, . . . ,≻n)
A voting rule is called strategy-proof if voters are not worse off by reporting true
preferences than reporting any other preference. That is,
∀n ∈ N+, ∀ ≻n∈ L(C)n, ∀ ≻,≻′∈ L(C),
r(≻n,≻) ≻ r(≻n,≻′)
A non-strategy-proof voting rule is called manipulable. The Gibbard and Sat-
terthwaite Theorem says that, any unanimous, and non-dictatorial voting rule
with at least three candidates is necessarily manipulable.
2.1 Asymptotic Collusion-proofness and Strategy-proofness
Given a voting rule r, a set of candidates C, n number of truthful voters, and a
coalition size c, we define c-collusion-proof voting profiles as follows.
Definition 1. (c-Collusion-proof Voting Profile) A voting profile ≻n∈ L(C)n is
called c-collusion-proof if ∀ ≻c1,≻
c
2∈ L(C)
c
,
r(≻n,≻c1) ≻
c
1 r(≻
n,≻c2)
2
For c = 1, these profiles are called strategy-proof voting profiles. Given a voting
rule r, we denote the set of all c-collusion-proof voting profiles by T cr (C). The
set of all strategy-proof voting profiles is denoted by Tr(C). We will drop the
subscript r whenever the context is clear. Notice that manipulation by c number
of new voters is game theoretically not possible in the above defined collusion-
proof profiles. We define the above notions with respect to new voters which
directly implies that the hardness of the CM problem at collusion-proof instances
is of no value. Previously, Slinko [Slinko, 2002] defined strategy-proof voting
profiles with respect to the existing voters. Obviously, our definition is more
aligned with the formulation of the CM problem and hence the results give
direct implications of the usefulness the CM problem being hard at a particular
instance.
1
Sn denotes the set of all permutations of the set {1, 2, . . . , n}.
2 We say a(≻1, . . . ,≻n)b if a ≻i b ∀i = 1, 2, . . . , n.
If r is a score based voting rule1, then we define strategy-proof and collusion-
proof scoring profiles as the scores that each candidate receive in some strategy-
proof and collusion-proof voting profiles respectively. For example, (8, 2, 2) is a
scoring profile in a plurality election with 12 voters and 3 candidates. This is
also a 5-collusion-proof scoring profile since 5 new voters can not manipulate
this election. The set of all possible scoring profiles in an election with n voters
is denoted by Snr (C). When the voting rule r is clear from the context, we will
drop r from the notation.
Clearly, since in score based voting rules, the winner is decided solely using
the scores of the candidates, the above definitions are independent of the choice of
strategy-proof or collusion-proof voting profiles if there are two or more voting
profiles giving rise to the same scoring profile. The notion of collusion-proof
scoring profiles has its motivation in computational social choice. For scoring
rules, the CM problem can also be thought of as if, we are given a scoring
profile generated out of the votes of the truthful voters and the question remains
the same. Here collusion-proofness of a scoring profile determines whether the
hardness of the CM problem is at all required or not at that profile. The above
notions naturally lead us to study a society where all the scoring profiles are
equally likely. We name this assumption the Impartial Scores Culture (ISC)
assumption.
With the above definitions, the notions of asymptotic strategy-proofness and
asymptotic collusion-proofness on voters and candidates are defined as follows.
Let D be a probability distribution over the voting profiles.
Definition 2. (Asymptotic Strategy-proofness on Voters) A voting rule r is
called asymptotically strategy-proof on voters if for all fixed and finite C,
lim
n→∞
Prob≻n∼D{≻
n∈ Tr(C)} = 1
In words, a voting rule is called asymptotically strategy-proof on voters if almost
all the voting profiles are strategy-proof as we increase the number of voters. On
similar lines, we define asymptotic strategy-proofness on candidates as follows.
Definition 3. (Asymptotic Strategy-proofness on Candidates) A voting rule r is
called asymptotically strategy-proof on candidates if ∃N0 ∈ N such that ∀n ≥ N0,
lim
|C|→∞
Prob≻n∼D{≻
n∈ Tr(C)} = 1
The above concepts are generalized to asymptotic collusion-proofness as follows.
Definition 4. (Asymptotic c-Collusion-proofness on Voters) A voting rule r is
called asymptotically c-collusion-proof on voters if for all fixed and finite C,
lim
n→∞
Prob≻n∼D{≻
n∈ T cr (C)} = 1
1 A voting rule is called a score based voting rule if winner is determined solely based
on scores. Positional scoring rules are examples of such rules.
Definition 5. (Asymptotic c-Collusion-proofness on Candidates) A voting rule
r is called asymptotically c-collusion-proof on candidates if ∃N0 ∈ N such that
∀n ≥ N0,
lim
|C|→∞
Prob≻n∼D{≻
n∈ T cr (C)} = 1
3 Results
We show that with this modified definition of strategy-proofness, many previ-
ously known results still hold. For almost all the voting rules studied in this
paper, we show that they are not asymptotically strategy-proof on candidates.
That is, the problem of manipulation is really severe where computationally
hard instances are. This shows that although there are evidences shown in the
literature for computational hardness not being a very strong barrier, there is
a good chance that the profiles which it is able to protect are really manipula-
ble. We show the above results under both IC and ISC societal assumptions. IC
assumption states that the voting profiles follow U(L(C)n) 1 probability distribu-
tion and the ISC assumes U(Snr (C)) probability distribution over scoring profiles.
The following sections contain our results. In the interest of space, proof of some
theorems have been skipped. They appear in the appendix.
3.1 Plurality Voting Rule
We first provide a complete characterization of the scoring profiles which are
strategy-proof under Plurality voting rule.
Proposition 1 For Plurality rule, following and only following scoring profiles
(x1, x2, . . . , xm) ∈ Sn([m]) are strategy-proof:2
1. (a) |xi − xj | = 1 or 0, ∀1 ≤ i, j ≤ m with lexicographic tie breaking for the
manipulator.
(b) x1 = x2 = · · · = xm with lexicographic tie breaking against the manipu-
lator.
2. ∃w ∈ [m] such that xw − xi ≥ 2, ∀1 ≤ i ≤ m, i 6= w, that is cw is the winner
and its score is greater than that of every other candidate by at least 2.
3. ∃w ∈ [m] such that xw > xi, ∀1 ≤ i ≤ m, i 6= w, with lexicographic tie
breaking rule against the manipulator.
In the profiles in 1(a), the scores of each pair of candidates differ by at most
1. We denote the set of all these scoring profiles by En([m]) for any scoring
rule. The set of all corresponding voting profiles are denoted by Fn([m]). For
c-collusion-proofness, we have the following characterization.
1 Given a finite set A, U(A) denotes the uniform probability distribution over A.
2 [m] := {1, 2, . . . ,m}.
Proposition 2 For plurality rule, following and only following scoring profiles
(x1, x2, . . . , xm) ∈ Sn([m]) are c-collusion (c>1) proof:
∃w ∈ {1, 2, . . . ,m} such that xw−xi ≥ c+1, ∀1 ≤ i ≤ m i 6= w , that is cw is the
winner and its score is at least c+1 greater than that of every other candidate.
The following lemma provides the cardinality of |Sn([m])| for plurality election.
Lemma 1. For Plurality rule, |Sn([m])| =
(
n+m−1
m−1
)
.
Theorem 1. Let A be the set of all c-collusion-proof Plurality scoring profiles.
Then |A||Sn([m])| ≥ (
n−c
n+1 )
m−1.
Proof. Let c be the coalition size; c = o(n). Consider the following map,
f : Sn−c−1([m]) −→ A, x := (x1, . . . , xm) 7→ (x1, . . . , xw + c+ 1, . . . , xm)
cw is the winner of scoring profile x. f is injective. Hence from Lemma 1,
|A| ≥ |Sn−c−1([m])| =
(
m+ n− c− 2
m− 1
)
Now we have,
|A|
|Sn([m])|
≥
(
m+n−c−2
m−1
)
(
m+n−1
m−1
)
=
(m+ n− c− 2) . . . (n− c)
(m+ n− 1) . . . (n+ 1)
≥
(
n− c
n+ 1
)m−1
The last inequality comes from the fact that a
b
≥ a−1
b−1 , ∀a, b ∈ N, 0 < a < b. ⊓⊔
The above bound immediately proves that plurality rule under ISC assumption
is asymptotically strategy-proof and asymptotically o(n)-collusion-proof on the
number of voters. The above results imply that in elections where the number
of voters, is large the problem of manipulation is not severe.
Theorem 2. For Plurality rule, for m > n, |E
n([m])|
|Sn([m])| ≥
(
m−n+1
m
)n
.
Hence plurality rule under ISC assumption is asymptotically strategy-proof on
candidates for lexicographic tie breaking rule for the manipulator, but not asymp-
totically strategy-proof on candidates with lexicographic tie breaking rule against
manipulator. Plurality is not c-collusion-proof for c > 1 on candidates.
3.2 k-Approval Voting Rule
k-Approval voting rule is the scoring rule with the score vector (1, . . . , 1, 0, . . . , 0),
the first k entries are 1 and rest are 0. The scoring profiles are given by,
Sn([m]) := {(x1, . . . , xm) ∈ Nm :
∑m
i=1 xi = nk, 0 ≤ xi ≤ n, ∀i ∈ [m]}
|Sn([m])| = Coefficient of xnk in (1+x+x2+· · ·+xn)m =
∑k
i=0(−1)
i
(
n(k−i)+m−1
m−1
)
Proposition 3 For k-Approval rule with 1 < k < m, following and only follow-
ing scoring profiles (x1, x2, . . . , xm) ∈ Sn([m]) are strategy-proof:
1. ∃w ∈ {1, 2, . . . ,m} such that xw − xi ≥ 2, ∀1 ≤ i ≤ m, i 6= w, that is cw is
the winner and its score is at least two more than every other candidates.
2. x1 = x2 = · · · = xm with lexicographic tie breaking rule for the manipulator.
For k-Approval voting rule with 1 < k < m, we have the following results.
Theorem 3. For k-Approval voting rule, |F
n([m])|
|Tn([m])| ≥
(
m−nk+1
m
)nk
.
Proof. We have,
|Fn([m])| = |En([m])|(nk)! ((m− k)!)n
=
(
m
nk
)
(nk)! ((m− k)!)n
=
m! ((m− k)!)n
(m− nk)!
The first equality comes from the fact that, for each scoring profile in En([m]),
there are (nk)! ((m− k)!)n many voting profiles which gives that scoring profile.
|Fn([m])|
|T n([m])|
=
m!
(m− nk)! (m(m− 1) . . . (m− k + 1))n
=
m(m− 1) . . . (m− nk + 1)
(m− nk)! (m(m− 1) . . . (m− k + 1))n
≥
(
m− nk + 1
m
)nk
⊓⊔
Hence plurality rule under IC assumption is asymptotically strategy-proof on
candidates for lexicographic tie breaking rule for the manipulator, but asymp-
totically manipulable on candidates with lexicographic tie breaking rule against
manipulator. Plurality is not c-collusion-proof for c > 1 on candidates. For
k > 1, k = o(m), k-Approval is not asymptotically strategy-proof on number
of candidates.
Proposition 4 For k-Approval rule with 1 < k < m, following scoring profiles
(x1, x2, . . . , xm) ∈ Sn([m]) are c-collusion-proof:
1. ∃w ∈ {1, 2, . . . ,m} such that xw − xi ≥ 2c, ∀1 ≤ i ≤ m, i 6= w, that is cw is
the winner and its score is at least two more than every other candidates.
Theorem 4. For 1 < k < m, k-approval is asymptotically o(n)-collusion-proof
on the number of voters under ISC assumption.
Veto Rule : Veto voting rule is (m−1)-Approval voting rule. Now since scoring
rules are invariant under affine transformations, we can consider veto as a scoring
rule with score vector being (0, 0, . . . , 0,−1). Clearly for veto,
Sn([m]) = {(x1, x2, . . . , xm) ∈ Z
m
≤0 :
m∑
i=1
xi = −n}
Hence |Snveto([m])| = |S
n
plurality([m])| =
(
n+m−1
n
)
. Theorem 4 implies that veto is
asymptotically o(n)-collusion-proof on the number of voters under ISC assump-
tion.
Proposition 5 For veto rule following scoring profiles (x1, x2, . . . , xm) ∈ Sn([m])
are c-collusion-proof:
1. ∃w ∈ {1, 2, . . . ,m} such that xw − xi ≥ c + 1, ∀1 ≤ i ≤ m i 6= w , i.e. cw is
the winner and its score is at least two more than every other candidates.
2. For c < m− 1, x1 = x2 = · · · = xm.
Lemma 2. For Veto rule, for m > n, |E
n([m])|
|Sn([m])| ≥
(
m−n+1
m
)n
.
Hence veto rule under ISC assumption is not asymptotically strategy-proof on
candidates.
Lemma 3. For Veto rule, for m > n, |F
n([m])|
|Sn([m])| ≥
(
m−n+1
m
)n
.
The above lemma shows that veto rule under IC assumption is not asymptotically
strategy-proof on candidates. The following theorem bounds the number of c-
collusion-proof strategy profiles for veto voting rule which will subsequently help
us to prove o(n)-collusion-proofness of veto voting rule.
Theorem 5. Let A be the set of all c-collusion-proof Veto scoring profiles. Then
|A|
|Sn([m])| ≥
(
n−(c+1)(m−1)+1
mn−(c+1)(m−1)
)(c+1)(m−1)
.
So under ISC , Veto voting rule is asymptotically o(n)-collusion-proof on the
number of voters.
3.3 Borda Voting Rule
For Borda voting rule, a score vector is (m− 1,m− 2, . . . , 0).
Proposition 6 For Borda rule, following and only following scoring profiles
(x1, x2, . . . , xm) ∈ Sn([m]) are strategy-proof:
1. ∃w ∈ {1, 2, . . . ,m} such that xw − xi ≥ m, ∀1 ≤ i ≤ m, i 6= w, that is cw
is the winner and its score is at least m greater than that of every other
candidates.
2. x1 = x2 = · · · = xm
3. Every candidate except one is tied with highest score and the loser’s score is
one less.
Before going to the asymptotic result for the Borda voting rule, let us state some
lemmas which we will be using later.
Lemma 4.
∑∞
i=2(−1)
i(i− 1)x
i
i! = 1− (1 + x)e
−x, ∀x ∈ R.
Lemma 5. ∀l ∈ N 1− (−1)l(l − 1) =
∑l−1
i=2(−1)
i(i − 1)
(
l
i
)
.
The next lemma gives a useful cardinality formula. Suppose we have m finite
sets namely A1, . . . , Am. Let A be the set of all elements which are present in at
least two sets. Then the following lemma computes the cardinality of the set A.
Lemma 6. |A| =
∑m
r=2(−1)
r(r − 1)
∑
I∈([m]r )
|AI |1.
The following lemma gives a sufficient condition for a voting profile to be ma-
nipulable for large number of candidates.
Lemma 7. For fixed n and large2 m, if in a voting profile (≻1, . . . ,≻n) ∈ L(C)
n
,
∃ci, cj ∈ C, ci 6= cj such that both ci and cj are ranked in the top l positions in
each preference ≻i, 1 ≤ i ≤ n where (l−1)n < m, then the profile is manipulable.
Theorem 6. Borda rule is not asymptotically strategy-proof on the number of
candidates under IC assumption.
Proof. Consider an election with n voters, m candidates. Let us define l :=
λm
n−1
n , λ ∈ N where λ is a constant. Let us assume m to be large enough to
satisfy the setting of Lemma 7. The existence of such an m is guaranteed from
the fact that l = Θ(m
n−1
n ). Let us define Ai for i ∈ [m] as follows,
Ai := {(≻j)nj=1 ∈ L(C)
n : i is ranked in the top l positions in ≻j , 1 ≤ j ≤ n}
Clearly, I ⊆ [m], |I| = k then,
|AI | =
{(
(m− l)!Πk−1i=0 (l − i)
)n
, if k ≤ l
0 , if k > l
Let us define the set A as follows,
A := {≻∈ L(C)n : ∃i, j ∈ [m], i 6= j,≻∈ Ai,≻∈ Aj}
Let us define the set of all manipulable voting profiles Mn([m]) as
Mn([m]) := L([m])n \ T n([m])
1 Let A be a set. Then
(
A
r
)
:= {B ⊆ A : |B| = r}. I be any subset of an index set.
Then AI := ∩i∈IAi.
2 large enough such that Item 2 and Item 3 of the Proposition 6 cannot occur.
From Lemma 7, it follows that A ⊆Mn([m]). Now,
|Mn([m])|
|L(C)n|
≥
|A|
(m!)n
=
l∑
r=2
(−1)r(r − 1)
∑
I∈([m]r )
|AI |
(m!)n
=
l∑
r=2
(−1)r(r − 1)
(
m
r
)(
Πr−1i=0
l − i
m− i
)n
lim
m→∞
|Mn([m])|
|L(C)n|
≥
∞∑
r=2
(−1)r(r − 1)
λrn
r!
= 1− (1 + λn)e−λ
n
The second step follows from Lemma 6, the fourth step is a result of using the
fact that l = Θ(m
n−1
n ), and the last step follows from Lemma 4. Now since the
above inequality is true for all λ ∈ R, we get,
lim
m→∞
|Mn([m])|
|L(C)n|
≥ sup
λ∈N
{1− (1 + λn)e−λ
n
} = 1
Therefore the Borda rule is not asymptotically strategy-proof on the number of
candidates under IC assumption. ⊓⊔
The above theorem shows that it is highly likely that the voting profiles for
which manipulating the Borda voting rule is intractable are actually manipula-
ble. Hence computational hardness provides some resistance against manipula-
tion of the Borda rule. The behavior of the Borda rule under ISC assumption is
still open.
4 Discussion and Future Work
For all the voting rules studied here, the severity of manipulation has been shown
to be present mostly in the elections with large number of candidates and not
in the cases with many voters. Also this is the first paper, to the best of our
knowledge, which tries to address the reverse question posed in the beginning
- the profiles which are being protected by computational hardness are at all
manipulable or not. We have studied some popular voting rules in this paper.
Certainly a general result would be much more interesting which is a prospective
future work.
We have explored a new societal assumption called ISC and argued for its
need in the context of computational social choice. We notice a positive corre-
lation among results under ISC assumption and under IC assumption. Again a
general result connecting these two concepts is another important future direc-
tion of research. Here we conjecture that a voting procedure is asymptotically
strategy-proof or c-collusion proof either on the number of voters or on the
number of candidates under ISC assumption if and only if it is so under IC as-
sumption. An interesting future direction is to find axiomatic characterization
of asymptotically strategy-proof voting rules.
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A Appendix
Proposition 1 For Plurality rule, following and following scoring profiles
(x1, x2, . . . , xm) ∈ Sn([m]) are strategy-proof:
1. (a) |xi − xj | = 1 or 0, ∀1 ≤ i, j ≤ m for lexicographic tie breaking for the
manipulator.
(b) x1 = x2 = · · · = xm for lexicographic tie breaking against the manipula-
tor.
2. ∃w ∈ [m] such that xw − xi ≥ 2, ∀1 ≤ i ≤ m, i 6= w, that is cw is the winner
and its score is at least two greater than that of every other candidate.
3. ∃w ∈ [m] such that xw > xi, ∀1 ≤ i ≤ m, i 6= w, with lexicographic tie
breaking rule against the manipulator.
Proof. The first case talks about the situations where the score of all the candi-
dates are as much same as possible. That is some candidates have highest score
each and others have score just one less than highest. Now if the new voter’s most
preferred candidate is already a candidate with highest score then her vote will
make the candidate the winner. If her most preferred candidate has not scored
highest then her vote will results in a tie and hence will make its candidate win
only with lexicographic tie breaking rule for the manipulators. Hence the first
case is strategy-proof.
The second and third cases deal with non-pivotal profiles, that is the new
candidate cannot change current winner and hence she has no incentive to lie.
Thus the scoring profile is strategy-proof.
In all other cases, the number of candidates tied for win or has score one less
than the winner’s, is more than one and there is a candidate whose score is at
least two less than the winner’s score. If the voter’s most preferred candidate is
the candidate with least score then she cannot make her most preferred candidate
win. But she can make one of the tied candidates and runner ups a winner
depending upon the tie breaking rule being used. Hence these scoring profiles
are manipulable. ⊓⊔
Proposition 2 For plurality rule, following and only following scoring profiles
(x1, x2, . . . , xm) ∈ Sn([m]) are c-collusion (c>1) proof:
– ∃w ∈ {1, 2, . . . ,m} such that xw − xi ≥ c+ 1, ∀1 ≤ i ≤ m i 6= w , that is cw
is the winner and its score is at least c+1 more than every other candidate.
Proof. On similar line of the proof of the Proposition 1.
Lemma 1. For Plurality rule, |Sn([m])| =
(
n+m−1
m−1
)
.
Proof. The set Sn([m]) is the solution set of the following equation.
m∑
i=1
xi = n, xi ∈ {0, 1, . . . , n}, ∀i ∈ [m]
Hence |Sn([m])| =
(
n+m−1
m−1
)
. ⊓⊔
Theorem 2. For Plurality rule, for m > n, |E
n([m])|
|Sn([m])| ≥
(
m−n+1
m
)n
.
Proof. We have,
|En([m])|
|Sn([m])|
=
(
m
n
)
(
m+n−1
n
)
=
m
m+ n− 1
.
m− 1
m+ n− 2
. . .
m− n+ 1
m
≥
(
m− n+ 1
m
)n
The last inequality comes from the fact that a
b
≥ a−1
b−1 , ∀a, b ∈ N, 0 < a < b. ⊓⊔
Proposition 3 For k-Approval rule with 1 < k < m, following and only follow-
ing scoring profiles (x1, x2, . . . , xm) ∈ S
n([m]) are strategy-proof:
1. ∃w ∈ {1, 2, . . . ,m} such that xw − xi ≥ 2, ∀1 ≤ i ≤ m, i 6= w, that is cw is
the winner and its score is at least two more than every other candidates.
2. x1 = x2 = · · · = xm with lexicographic tie breaking rule for the manipulator.
Proof. The first case deals with non-pivotal cases, i.e. the new candidate can
not change current winner and hence he/she has no incentive to lie. Thus the
scoring profile in non-manipulable. In the second case, the situation is same as
with one voter and thus non-manipulable.
In all other cases, letW = {c1, . . . , cw} be the set of all candidates with maximum
score, R = {cw+1, . . . , cm} be rest of the candidates. If the new voter’s true
preference is c1 ≻ c2 ≻ . . . cw ≻ cw+1 ≻ . . . cm then new voter can clearly
manipulate. ⊓⊔
Proposition 4 For k-Approval rule with 1 < k < m, following scoring profiles
(x1, x2, . . . , xm) ∈ Sn([m]) are c-collusion-proof:
1. ∃w ∈ {1, 2, . . . ,m} such that xw − xi ≥ 2c, ∀1 ≤ i ≤ m, i 6= w, that is cw is
the winner and its score is at least two more than every other candidates.
Proof. The new c voters cannot change the outcome of the election and hence
the profiles are c-collusion-proof. ⊓⊔
Theorem 4. For 1 < k < m, k-approval is asymptotically o(n)-collusion-proof
on the number of voters under ISC assumption.
Proof. Define l :=
(
m−1
k−1
)
, l′ :=
(
m−2
k−2
)
. Let c be the coalition size. c = o(n). Let
A be the set of all c-collusion-proof scoring profiles with n voters and m candi-
dates. Consider the following map,
f : Sn−lc([m]) −→ A
(x1, x2, . . . , xm) 7→ (x1 + l
′, . . . , xw + l, . . . , xm + l
′)
where cw is the winner. Hence,
|A| ≥ |Sn−lc([m])|
=
k∑
i=0
(−1)i
(
(n− lc)(k − i) +m− 1
m− 1
)
Now,
1 ≥ lim
n→∞
|A|
|Sn([m])|
≥ lim
n→∞
∑k
i=0(−1)
i
(
(n−lc)(k−i)+m−1
m−1
)
∑k
i=0(−1)
i
(
n(k−i)+m−1
m−1
)
= 1
The last equality comes from the fact that c = o(n), and l, l′ are independent
of n. Hence the probability that an uniformly randomly chosen scoring profile is
o(n)-collusion-proof goes to one as the number of voters increases and the result
follows. ⊓⊔
Proposition 5 For veto rule following scoring profiles (x1, x2, . . . , xm) ∈ Sn([m])
are c-collusion-proof:
1. ∃w ∈ {1, 2, . . . ,m} such that xw − xi ≥ c + 1, ∀1 ≤ i ≤ m i 6= w , i.e. cw is
the winner and its score is at least two more than every other candidates.
2. For c < m− 1, x1 = x2 = · · · = xm.
Proof. The first case deals with non-pivotal cases, i.e. the new voter can not
change current winner and hence she has no incentive to lie. Thus the scoring
profile in non-manipulable.
In the second case, the situation is same as with one voter and thus non-
manipulable.
In all other cases, let W be the set of all candidates with maximum score, R be
the set of all candidates with score one less than winners’ and L be the set of
rest of the candidates. Not W 6= C since otherwise this will be same as case two.
Hence at least one of R or L must be non-empty. Now if the least preferred can-
didate of new voters is not in W then new voters can certainly manipulate. ⊓⊔
Lemma 2. For Veto rule, for m > n, |E
n([m])|
|Sn([m])| ≥
(
m−n+1
m
)n
.
Proof. Consider the following map,
f : En(veto)([m]) −→ E
n
(plurality)([m])
(x1, x2, . . . , xm) 7→ (−x1,−x2, . . . ,−xm)
The map is clearly bijective and hence the result follows from Theorem 2. ⊓⊔
Lemma 3. For Veto rule, for m > n, |F
n([m])|
|Sn([m])| ≥
(
m−n+1
m
)n
.
Proof. Follows from the fact that |Fn(veto)([m])| = |F
n
(plurality)([m])| and Theo-
rem 3. ⊓⊔
Theorem 5. Let A be the set of all c-collusion-proof Veto scoring profiles. Then
|A|
|Sn([m])| ≥
(
n−(c+1)(m−1)+1
mn−(c+1)(m−1)
)(c+1)(m−1)
.
Proof. Let c be the coalition size. Consider the following map,
f : Sn−(c+1)(m−1)([m]) −→ A
x = (x1, . . . , xm) 7→ (x1 − (c+ 1), . . . , xw, . . . , xm − (c+ 1))
cw is the winner of scoring profile x. This map is clearly injective. Hence
|A| ≥ |Sn−(c+1)(m−1)([m])| =
(
m+n−(c+1)(m−1)−1
m−1
)
. We have,
|A|
|Sn([m])|
≥
(
m+n−(c+1)(m−1)−1
m−1
)
(
m+n−1
m−1
)
=
n . . . (n− (c+ 1)(m− 1)− 1)
(m+ n− 1) . . . (m+ n− (c+ 1)(m− 1))
≥
(
n− (c+ 1)(m− 1) + 1
mn− (c+ 1)(m− 1)
)(c+1)(m−1)
The last inequality comes from the fact that a
b
≥ a−1
b−1 , ∀a, b ∈ N, 0 < a < b. ⊓⊔
Proposition 6 For Borda rule, following and only following scoring profiles
(x1, x2, . . . , xm) ∈ Sn([m]) are strategy-proof:
1. ∃w ∈ {1, 2, . . . ,m} such that xw − xi ≥ m, ∀1 ≤ i ≤ m, i 6= w, that is cw is
the winner and its score is at least m more than every other candidates.
2. x1 = x2 = · · · = xm
3. Every candidate except one are tied with highest score and the loser’s score
is one less.
Proof. First case covers non-pivotal scoring profiles, i.e. current winner does not
change irrespective of new voter’s vote. The second case is similar to one voter
case. In the third case, it is always best response for a new voter to cast his/her
true preference. Hence these are non-manipulable scoring profiles. Now we will
show that every other scoring profiles are manipulable.
Case I - unique candidate with highest score: In this case, runner up candidate’s
score is within m of winner’s score. Let cw is the winner and cr is a runner up.
Consider a new voter with preference cr ≻ cw ≻ . . . . Now if the voter casts
truthfully then cw will be a winner. But casting cr ≻ · · · ≻ cw makes cr unique
winner. Hence this scoring profile is manipulable.
Case II - more than one candidate with highest score: In this case more than
one candidate has got highest score. Without loss of generality we may assume
c1, c2, . . . , ci with 1 < i < m. If i < m − 1 then a new voter with preference
cm ≻ c1 ≻ c2 ≻ · · · ≻ ci ≻ . . . is better off by casting cm ≻ · · · ≻ c1 ≻ c2 ≻
· · · ≻ ci. If i = m − 1 then xm < x1 − 1 and hence a voter with preference
cm ≻ c1 ≻ c2 ≻ · · · ≻ cm−1 is better off by reporting c1 ≻ c2 ≻ · · · ≻ cm. Hence
these profiles are manipulable. ⊓⊔
Lemma 4.
∑∞
i=2(−1)
i(i− 1)x
i
i! = 1− (1 + x)e
−x.
Proof. We know,
e−x =
∑∞
i=0(−1)
i x
i
i!
⇒ −e−x =
∑∞
i=0(−1)
i−1 (i+1)x
i
(i+1)!
⇒ −xe−x =
∑∞
i=1(−1)
i ix
i
i!
⇒ −xe−x =
∑∞
i=2(−1)
i(i− 1)x
i
i!
+
∑∞
i=1(−1)
i x
i
i!
⇒ −xe−x =
∑∞
i=2(−1)
i(i− 1)x
i
i! + e
−x − 1
The second step follows by taking derivative with respect to x on both side. The
result follows from the last step. ⊓⊔
Lemma 5. ∀l ∈ N
1− (−1)l(l − 1) =
l−1∑
i=2
(−1)i(i− 1)
(
l
i
)
.
Proof. We know that ∀l ∈ N, x ∈ R+,
(1− x)l =
∑l
i=0(−1)
l
(
l
i
)
xi
⇒ (1−x)
l
x
=
∑l
i=0(−1)
l
(
l
i
)
xi−1
⇒ − (1−x)
l
x2
− l (1−x)
l−1
x
=
∑l
i=0(i − 1)(−1)
l
(
l
i
)
xi−2
⇒ 1− (−1)l(l − 1) =
∑l−1
i=2(−1)
i(i− 1)
(
l
i
)
The second step is derived by dividing both side by x. At third step, we take
derivative with respect to x. We have instantiated x to be 1 at fourth step. ⊓⊔
Lemma 6. |A| =
∑m
r=2(−1)
r(r − 1)
∑
I∈([m]r )
|AI |.
Proof. Let us define |A| =
∑m
r=2 ar
∑
I∈([m]r )
|AI | such that after r terms, all the
elements which are present in at most r many sets have been counted exactly
once. Hence it is enough to prove that,
ar = (−1)
r(r − 1), ∀2 ≤ r ≤ m.
We will prove the above statement by induction on r.
Base case : a2 = 1 since no elements and particularly the elements present in
exactly two sets have not been counted.
Inductive step : Let us assume the result for r ≤ l − 1.
Now till the first l − 1 terms, the elements present in exactly l many sets have
been counted exactly
∑l−1
i=2 ai
(
l
i
)
many times. Hence,
al = 1−
∑l−1
i=2 ai
(
l
i
)
= 1−
∑l−1
i=2(−1)
i(i− 1)
(
l
i
)
= (−1)l(l − 1)
The second step follows from the inductive hypothesis and the third step follows
from Lemma 5. ⊓⊔
Lemma 7. For fixed n and large m, if in a voting profile (≻1, . . . ,≻n) ∈ L(C)
n
,
∃ci, cj ∈ C, ci 6= cj such that both ci and cj are ranked in the top l positions in
each preference ≻i, 1 ≤ i ≤ n where (l−1)n < m, then the profile is manipulable.
Proof. Since we are working with voting rules and not with voting correspon-
dences, the winner is unique. Hence WLOG WMA1 that ci is not the winner.
Let cw be the winner. Then,
score(cw) ≤ (m− 1)n and score(ci) ≥ (m− l)n
Hence we have,
score(cw)− score(ci) ≤ (l − 1)n ≤ m
The above statement along with Proposition 6 proves the lemma. ⊓⊔
1 WLOG : Without Loss Of Generality. WMA : We May Assume.
